The purpose of a safety case is to argue that a system is acceptably safe to operate in a specified context This argument demonstrates how the available evidence can be interpreted as compliance with the applicable safety objectives. As such, one might expect each safety case to be a unique synthesis of the particular pieces of evidence, safety objectives etc. However, we have observed common, re-used, approaches to arguing safety (especially within well-defined domains) -repeated structures of 'successful' (i.e. correct, comprehensive and convincing) arguments.
Informal reuse of safety case arguments is already commonplace -i.e. using 'largely the same' arguments of safety as used on previous projects. This form of reuse often occurs through 'Cut and Paste' of the textual safety case documents between projects. However, there are a number of problems with such an approach:
• It can be difficult to identify opportunities for reuse (i.e. take full advantage of successful arguments) • Reuse occurs in an ad-hoc fashion -in a way that cannot be predicted or depended upon for project management • Inappropriate reuse occurs. The context of a safety argument may not be exactly the same from one instance to another. Critical assumptions may be challenged.
• Lack of traceability. There is difficulty in knowing where arguments have been repeated. Problems can arise if 'faulty' arguments are propagated.
• Lack of consistency / process maturity -different (sometimes only subtly different) argument approaches may be unnecessarily used where reuse would improve consistency of approach and better support claims of a mature process.
• Loss of knowledge. There is no mechanism or medium for recording the essential 'best practice' of safety case development / safety argument construction.
For the nature and level of reuse we anticipated the approach of identifying and describing 'patterns' of safety argument seem to fit naturally with our objectives:
• We do not wish to define whole reusable safety cases -just elements, themes and structuring concepts within the safety case.
• We are not interested in establishing hard and fast rules to be applied in safety case construction.
Instead, we wish to provide guidance and exemplars that can be adapted according to individual situations.
• We need to ensure that the reusable arguments were well documented with concepts such as intent, context and applicability captured (to avoid the problem of inappropriate reuse).
Having a clear representation of safety arguments was a pre-requisite to attempting any form of safety argument reuse. (It is extremely difficult to recognise and capture a reusable concept if there is no means of describing it!). The Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) [Wilson95] is a graphical notation developed in York explicitly for the purpose of representing safety case arguments. The next section provides a brief overview of the notation.
The Goal Structuring Notation
The principal elements of the notation are shown in Figure 1 (with example instances of each concept). 
Context

Figure 1 -Principal Elements of the Goal Structuring Notation
These elements are placed together to form a goal structure. The purpose of a goal structure is to show how goals are broken down into sub-goals, and eventually supported by evidence (solutions) whilst making clear the strategies adopted, the rationale for the approach (assumptions, justifications) and the context in which goals are stated. For further details on GSN see [Wilson95] . Figure 2 shows an example goal structure with some of the basic elements placed together to form a safety argument (albeit a heavily simplified one in this case). figure, . In these books, Alexander is looking at the successful and unsuccessful features of buildings -what makes people enjoy living or working in a certain space, why a particular arrangement of streets or looks appealing or fosters a sense of community. In doing this, he attempted to capture principles explicitly that may previously been implicit -in order that they can be reused. Figure 3 shows an example architectural pattern in the style of Alexander.
In this
This pattern attempts to draw out the elements that make a courtyard successful ('living') or unsuccessful ('dead'). The successful courtyard on the left, has a flow of traffic through it, a focus of interest for someone sitting on the seat (e.g. a fountain) and a view and light provided through the exit at the top of the drawing. With the 'dead' courtyard, on the other hand, there is no real reason to enter the yard (no other exit), no focal point for people sitting on the sit and a lack of light through having three solid walls.
Figure 3 -A Building Pattern in the Style of Alexander
The design patterns community has attempted to relate such ideas to the construction of software -i.e. what makes a software architecture work well, be maintainable, be easily extended etc. Primarily this work has been in the Object-Oriented community but it is increasingly being recognised that the concepts are more widely applicable than just to OO designs. An important addition to the 'patterns' concept made by the Design Patterns community is the principle of capturing and recording the underlying rationale and principles of a pattern through structured documentation. Several formats have been proposed for this purpose -the format proposed by Gamma et al in [Gamma95] probably being the most widely adopted. This format suggests documenting design patterns under the following headings:
• Pattern Name and Classification
Safety Case Patterns
On examining the work of the Design Patterns community, we felt that the concepts could be readily applied to safety arguments to create Safety Case Patterns. These patterns, rather than addressing successful ways of putting buildings or software objects together, instead capture successful (i.e. convincing, well argued, easily understood etc.) argument approaches that are used within the safety case.
As with Design Patterns, we wish to employ Safety Case Patterns as the medium for capturing:
• Solutions that evolved over time The principal underlying Safety Case Patterns is to combine, the GSN described in Section 2 and the patterning concepts of the software design community. To do this required some extension of the GSN in order that it could be used to support structural and entity abstraction (as, for example, OMT does for Design Patterns). Figure 4 shows a simple goal structure pattern that uses these extensions. 
In order to support this strategy, it is necessary to have identified all system functions affecting overall safety (C1) e.g. through a Functional Hazard Analysis. In addition, it is also necessary to put forward (and develop) the claim that either all the identified functions are independent, and therefore have no interactions that could give rise to hazards (G4) or that any interactions that have been identified are non-hazardous (G3).
A Safety Case Pattern is not simply a GSN Pattern as shown in Figure 4 . Additionally, there should always be a supporting pattern description (using the headings given by Gamma et al. in the previous section). To define patterns without clearly stating the underlying motivation and intent and without making clear where and (perhaps more importantly from a safety perspective) where not patterns should be applied could result in ignorant and inappropriate use of argument patterns within new projects. We provide a example of a fully documented safety case pattern as an appendix to this paper.
Our Experience To-Date with Safety Case Patterns
We have found that patterns can emerge at many different levels in a safety argument. We have found high level patterns such as the Functional Breakdown Pattern shown in Figure 4 and similar Hazard Directed Breakdown Patterns. These can be viewed as fundamental ('divide-and-conquer') approaches that exist within the armoury of approaches to constructing safety arguments. At the other extreme, we have also identified quite 'low level' patterns, e.g. capturing the types of claims that can be inferred from certain forms of evidence. We have also experienced that there are opportunities for both horizontal reuse (across domains) and vertical reuse (within a specific domain). An example of a domain-general pattern is a pattern for arguing adherence to Software Integrity Levels -the general concepts being applicable to a wide range of industries. An example of a domain specific pattern is a pattern for arguing compliance with specific regulatory principles (e.g. aerospace requirement or nuclear safety assessment principle) that can't easily (or usefully) be transferred from one industry to another.
Summary
Common argument approaches exist between safety case developments. Informal reuse of safety case material already occurs -but in an uncontrolled, unpredictable and potentially dangerous manner. Based on the principles of Design Patterns combined with the safety argument representation concepts provided by the Goal Structuring Notation, we have developed the concept of Safety Case Patterns. Using these patterns it has been possible to identify and record reusable arguments in a number of situations and at different levels within the safety case. By creating a 'recipe book' of these approaches (our ongoing activity) we believe it is possible to capture expertise and improve safety case construction. 
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Intent
This pattern provides a framework for arguing that identified risks in a system have been sufficiently addressed in accordance with the ALARP principle.
Also Known As
• Risk Reduction Argument Pattern
Motivation
This pattern was developed for two reasons:
• To argue compliance with the ALARP principle at the highest level when addressing system level hazards.
• To provide a more structured approach to presenting a 'Hazard Avoidance' argument (See Hazard Avoidance Pattern) by showing differing treatment of hazards according to their associated risk.
G1
Defines the overall objective of the pattern
G2, G3, G4
Defines targets for three classes of identified risks: negligible, tolerable, and intolerable
Sn1
Provided at this point to support the claim that no intolerable risks have (ever) been identified with the system
G6 or G7 and G8
Claims either that hazard has been eliminated or associated risk reduced to a tolerable level and dealt with as a tolerable risk.
G8
Defines ALARP target for each identified tolerable risk G10, G11, G12 Claims required to support ALARP target:
• Hazard only acceptable if positive benefit achieved
• Risk reduction measures have been taken up to the point where further measures would be disproportionate to benefit gained.
G9
Claim for each remaining hazard that associated risk shown to be negligible
C1
A context identifying all system hazards, including indication of associated risks (e.g. Risk Category from A, B, C, D).
C2, C3, C4
A workable definition of 'intolerable'/ 'tolerable'/ 'negligible' risks that can be used as a basis for selection from the list of hazards (e.g. Intolerable = Risk Category A, Tolerable = Risk Category B or C, Negligible = D).
C5
The ALARP principle relies on some understanding of when it is no longer cost-effective to spend further money on risk reduction. This element, a definition of cost-effectiveness, is therefore required.
An important aspect of this pattern is that it divides and conquers the goal of hazard mitigation / elimination according to the level of risk associated with each hazard. There are three strands to the safety argument: one tackling intolerable risks, one tackling tolerable risk and one discounting negligible risks. To satisfactorily support the top-level goal (G1) it is important that these three strands address all identified risks. The definitions of tolerable, intolerable and negligible (C3, C2 and C4 respectively) should therefore be so defined to cover and classify the range of possible levels of risks. It should also be noted that the definitions of negligibility (C4) and disproportionate (C5) cannot be considered entirely independently. It would not make sense, for example, to force risk reduction to a level below that identified elsewhere as negligible.
As the goal structure shows, if the means of addressing a previously identified intolerable risk is to reduce it to a tolerable level, then the remaining risk must be tackled as for all tolerable risks. If the level of risk has been reduced to a negligible level, then the hazard must be tackled as a negligible risk. It is important that the source of Identified System Hazards (C1) identifies the level of risk posed by a hazard in a way that permits sub-division into the classes of risk defined by C2, C3 and C4.
This pattern is applicable in contexts where the ALARP principle is accepted as the device for reasoning about the relative importance of risks and the cost-effectiveness of risk reduction. In order to apply this pattern it is necessary to have access to the following contextual information: 
